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ESSAY
LAW IN THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE: CAN LAW HELP TO
IMPROVE DOCTOR-PATIENT TRUST IN CHINA?*
Benjamin L. Liebmant
Can law help to address the lack of trust in doctor-patient
relationships in China? This essay examines the role that law, on the
books and in practice, has played in the rise and resolution of patient1 -
doctor disputes and conflict in China. Law has generally played a
secondary role in medical disputes: most patient claims never make it to
court, and there is little evidence that negotiated outcomes are influenced
by legal standards. Yet a legal framework weighted in favor of hospitals
and doctors almost certainly exacerbated doctor-patient conflict in the
2000s. Patients facing legal procedures and rules that appeared to offer
little hope of redress took their complaints to the streets. The threat of
protest and violence also influenced how courts handled the cases that
ended up in court, with courts creating new legal standards or ignoring
formal law in order to appease plaintiffs. The result was lack of trust in
formal law and the legal process from both plaintiffs and defendants.
Changes to written law and in court practice since 2010 have lessened
some of the perceived unfairness of the legal framework for patients.
Nevertheless, lawyers both for plaintiffs and for hospitals continue to
argue that the system is unfair. Limited evidence suggests that the legal
system does a poor job of separating valid from invalid claims and of
incentivizing hospitals to reduce malpractice. The few steps taken to date
by local and national authorities to use law to address rising doctor-
patient conflict have largely focused on addressing the problem of protest,
not the lack of trust between patients and doctors or the extent of
malpractice.
Prepared for "Rebuilding Patient-Physician Trust in China Summit," Harvard
Shanghai Center, October 10-11, 2015.
t Robert L. Lieff Professor of Law and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies,
Columbia Law School.
11 use "patient" to refer to patients and to their families. Many lawsuits and protests are
brought by family members of patients, in particular in cases in which the patient is
deceased.
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Part I of this essay provides a brief overview of the problem of conflict
arising from patient-doctor disputes. Part II examines the formal legal
framework governing medical disputes in China, i.e. the law on the books.
Part III describes the effect (or lack thereof) of formal law on actual
practice, on the streets, and in courtrooms, with a particular focus on
developments since China's Tort Liability Law came into effect in 2010.
Part IV concludes by arguing that law has played and will likely continue
to play a minor role in reducing patient-hospital conflict. In the short
term, the best hope may be that the legal framework governing patient-
hospital disputes does not exacerbate the existing dynamics of distrust.
. This essay updates my prior work on medical dispute resolution in
China, examining developments since 2010 and focusing in greater detail
on the question of how China's legal framework might address the
dynamics of distrust that characterize doctor-patient relationships in
China. 2 This essay argues that despite steps taken in formal law to
ameliorate some of the perceived unfairness of the legal framework
governing medical disputes, little has changed on the ground. Those
looking to law to play a role in diffusing doctor-patient conflict in China
are likely to be disappointed. The legal system continues primarily to
reflect, rather than to address, the lack of trust in Party-state institutions
that has been a major contributor to rising unrest in China. Targeted
legal reforms could help modestly, and this essay suggests a need to shift
the focus of legal debate in China from dispute resolution and protest to
steps that might improve the quality of and patients' confidence in the
medical system.
I. THE PROBLEM
The extent and intensity of protest, often violent, by patients and
their families against doctors and hospitals have been extensively
discussed in both the media and in academic accounts. 3 Major incidents
of violence against doctors attract extensive media attention, leading one
official report to describe medical disputes as "bloody conflicts concerning
the accumulation of power in society." 4 Less extreme forms of protest
attract less coverage but are even more common and may be extremely
disruptive to hospitals. Protest has become a routine tool for patients
seeking compensation from hospitals, both in instances of clear
2 See Benjamin L. Liebman, Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2013). This essay draws on Malpractice Mobs for background
information, at times without direct citation. This essay also draws on informal background
conversations with a range of legal and medical professionals in China.
3 Id. at 228-229.
4 Li Qiumeng (4E# 0), Zhengxie Weiyuan: Ying Jiada Daji Yinao Weihu Shehui Wending
(lFA" : Q± [CPPCC Member: Hospital Protests Ought to Be
Cracked Down On with Greater Force to Maintain Social Stability] (Mar. 12, 2011),
http ://news. 163.com/11/0312/02/6UTN67RC00014AED.html.
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negligence and in cases of adverse outcomes. 5 As one hospital official
commented, "if a living person goes in and a dead person comes out, then
the family will protest."6
Frequent media accounts of negligence by and the indifference of
doctors and hospital staff have led to the popular perception that
malpractice, often egregious, is common. Lack of empirical work makes
assessing the frequency of protest, violence, and negligence by doctors
difficult; 7 some recent media accounts suggest that the frequency of
serious cases of yinao (literally "medical chaos," the term most commonly
used to describe patient protest) may be declining.8 In my interactions
with doctors, hospital officials, lawyers, and academics there has been
near consensus that violence against medical staff and egregious forms of
malpractice are common. The causes of the volume of protest and the
incidence of error are complex. But it is clear that the rise in disputes and
the frequency of violence in such disputes are products of a number of
factors, including the marketization and cost of health care, the
compensation structure for doctors, reliance on the sale of drugs by
hospitals and doctors to generate income, the difficulty of obtaining
appointments at hospitals, the short time doctors spend with patients,
delays in treatment, quality of care, corruption, lack of insurance for
catastrophic illness, absence of a robust social safety network, and a
general lack of trust in state institutions.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As medical disputes, protests, and violence surged in China in the
2000s, law often appeared to play a secondary role to action on the streets
and in hospital hallways. I am not aware of any studies that have
Patients are not alone in protesting. Media accounts have also detailed protests by
doctors and nurses in response to the violence. Shan Chungang (4.mI), Henan Luoyang
Xiang Ganbu Feifa Jujin 4 Ming Hushi Bei Tingzhi Juliu ( t;::FP8$ 4 48 ±
9WR, W) [Township Cadres in Luoyang, Henan, Were Removed from Office and Detained
for Illegally Detaining Four Nurses] XINHUA WANG (MJ VA) [XINHUA NET], (Nov. 22, 2007),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-11/22/content_7123801.htm; Qiu Shuo ( # 9 ),
Nanping Shi Diyi Yiyuan Guanyu '6.21' Yihuan Jiufen Yinfa Bufen Yiwu Renyuan
Shangfang Jingguo de Baogao ( -- "6.2" I -v , -i
il n * * ) [Nanping City No. 1 Hospital's Report on the Protest of Medical Workers.
Following the June 21 Hospital-Patient Dispute], Tianya Shequ (5 R94± ) [TIANYA
COMMUNITY] (June 23, 2009), http://www.tianya.cnlpublicforumlcontent/freel/1603 9 5
6.shtml.
6 Liebman, supra note 2, at 233.
7 The frequency of malpractice is of course a highly contested question even in countries
such as the United States with extensive empirical scholarship on the topic. See A. Russel
Localio, et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence-
Results of the Harvard Medical Study HI, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 245, 245 (1991).
8 Such reports focus on specific local jurisdictions and appear to be largely official local
media praising the efforts of local authorities. Such reports thus should be treated with
skepticism. They do, however, reflect the pressure local authorities have come under to
reduce (and to reduce reports on) incidents of doctor-patient conflict in recent years.
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examined the percentage of cases resolved informally or through the
courts. Hospital officials and lawyers estimate that nearly ninety percent
of patient-hospital disputes are resolved before they get to the courts.9
Nevertheless, judges also reported medical disputes increasing beginning
in the early 2000s and taking up a greater amount of judges' time, largely
due to the need to manage such cases to prevent escalation and unrest.
Even if most disputes are not resolved through formal law or with
reference to legal standards, it is clear that the legal framework
governing medical disputes in China contributed to the rise of patient-
doctor conflict. Throughout the 2000s, the law governing medical disputes
was weighted against patients in ways that undermined trust in the
medical and dispute resolution systems. Although the legal framework
has shifted since 2010, ambiguities and problems remain, and patients
and doctors continue to view the current system as profoundly unfair.
From 2002 to 2010, medical disputes in China were primarily
governed by the 2002 Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents, issued
by China's State Council (the "Regulations").10 Under the Regulations, a
plaintiff seeking compensation was required to show that the defendant1 1
was responsible for a "medical accident," defined as an error causing
personal injury to a patient that resulted from medical personnel
negligently violating relevant laws, administrative regulations, rules,
standards governing medical care, or ordinary practice. 12 Cases involving
"medical accidents" were covered by the Regulations; those not involving
a "medical accident" were not covered by the Regulations.
Two aspects of the Regulations attracted the most controversy. First,
under the Regulations, damages awarded to plaintiffs in medical accident
cases were low - significantly lower than in other tort cases. This was
because the Regulations did not permit recovery of compensation for
death in cases in which medical accidents led to a patient's death. In
contrast, other tort claims were governed by the Supreme People's Court's
(SPC's) 2003 interpretation on damages in personal injury cases, 13 which
9 This figure is broadly in line with settlement rates elsewhere. As discussed below, what
appears to be unusual in China is the legal framework's lack of impact on settlement
negotiations and decisions.
lo Yiliao Shigu Chul Tiaoli (E-1Tk5*) [Regulations on the Disposition of Medical
Accidents] (promulgated by the St. Council., Feb. 20, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002), ST.
COUNCIL GAz., May 10, 2002, at 6, available at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2005-
08/0 1/content_18999.htm.
11 The overwhelming majority of defendants are hospitals. Chinese law does not provide
for individual tort liability against doctors. Individuals are generally named as defendants
only in cases in which individuals operate medical clinics outside of hospitals (often village
clinics) or in cases alleging the illegal practice of medicine. Hospitals often require that staff
pay a portion of any settlement or court award resulting from their negligence.
12 Regulations on the Disposition of Medical Accidents, supra note 10, art. 2.
13 Guanyu Shenl Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(AI J= 3 A M - M _ A i f f= A * X :F f= Z V 9) [Interpretation of Some Issues
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal
[Vol. 30:113
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provided for a death compensation award of twenty times the average
local income for deaths resulting from tortious actions. In practice, this
meant that plaintiffs in medical cases who prevailed in court often
received hundreds of thousands of yuan less than plaintiffs in other tort
cases.
Second, under the Regulations, all determinations regarding whether
or not a "medical error" had occurred were required to be made by medical
review boards established by local medical associations. Courts were
required to defer to these determinations. 14 The use of medical review
boards was designed to ensure that medical professionals resolved
questions relating to the standard of care or causation. In practice,
however, the medical review boards were widely viewed as protecting
doctors and hospitals by finding no error or by finding any error to be
minor. Local doctors judged their peers, hearings were brief, decisions
were generally short and lacked reasoning, and review board members
did not appear in court. There has been extensive debate (and little
empirical evidence) on the fairness of medical review boards. Hospitals
and doctors argue that the boards are essential to ensuring fairness to
hospitals and doctors and that only medical professionals are capable of
making determinations based on the standard of care.
Actual outcomes were likely less important than appearances. The
use of local doctors to determine the fault of other local doctors in a
process that lacked transparency virtually guaranteed that patients
would view outcomes as biased and unfair. Patients reacted by seeking
other mechanisms to protect their interests. Perceiving little chance of
prevailing before medical review boards and a legal system that paid far
less for deaths due to medical negligence than for other tort claims, many
plaintiffs took their claims to the streets.
Plaintiffs and their lawyers also responded to the perceived
unfairness of the medical review boards by seeking to avoid the
Regulations entirely. A second track of litigation developed. Litigants
frequently sued hospitals and doctors for ordinary negligence (not for a
"medical accident"), relying on China's General Principles of the Civil
Law and the SPC's Interpretation. In such cases, determinations
regarding whether defendant conduct was negligent were made by
judicial inspection agencies, quasi-private entities 5 retained by parties to
the litigation. Damages in such cases were not limited by the restrictions
in the Regulations. Hospitals, doctors, and their lawyers condemned this
practice as illegal and denounced judicial inspection institutions as
lacking expertise (most determinations by judicial inspection agencies
Injury] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 26, 2003, effective May 1, 2004), 2004
SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 2, at 3.
'4 Regulations on the Disposition of Medical Accidents, supra note 10.
15 Judicial inspection agencies were originally established under local courts. Judicial
inspection organizations were separated from the courts in 2005. Although registered with
local justice departments and often affiliated with public institutions such as universities,
most judicial inspection agencies operate largely as commercial entities.
2016]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW
are made by individuals trained as medical lawyers or in forensics, not
doctors with experience treating patients.) Some courts permitted the
practice, in particular for minor claims or claims resulting from
allegations of illegal conduct by doctors or hospitals. Other courts,
however, adopted more defendant-friendly practices and required all but
the most minor claims to be brought to medical review boards. Although
the SPC indicated that it authorized this second track of medical dispute
resolution, neither the SPC nor China's legislature directly addressed the
tension between the litigation under the Regulations and litigation
brought pursuant to the General Principles of Civil Law and the SPC's
interpretation.
China enacted a comprehensive Tort Liability Law in 2009, which
became effective in 2010.16 The Tort Law changed the law governing
medical disputes in three major ways. 17 First, the Tort Law standardized
damage awards across tort cases, meaning that plaintiffs in medical
disputes may receive damages for wrongful death, as in other tort cases.18
Second, the Tort Law shifted the burden of proof in most cases from
defendants to plaintiffs. 19 Third, the law created an explicit cause of
action, with fault assumed and the burden of proof on defendants, for any
illegal conduct or violation of treatment standards by hospitals, doctors,
or hospital staff or any alteration or concealment of medical records.
The Tort Law eliminated controversy over whether plaintiffs can
recover damages for wrongful death. The law also eliminated the
distinction between cases alleging a "medical accident" and those alleging
1sZhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Qinquan Zeren Fa (r*AJK. t iE) [Tort
Liability Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) 2010 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. GAZ. 4, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-12/26/content_1497435.htm.
17 The Tort Law did not specifically revoke the Regulations, and the Regulations remain
in place. Aspects of the Regulations that are in conflict with the Tort Law are understood to
be no longer effective. Other portions of the Regulations, in particular those governing
administrative sanctions against hospitals and doctors, remain valid. As discussed below,
there is debate about whether the provisions of the Regulations governing medical review
boards remain effective.
18 At the time the Tort Law became effective, some speculated as to whether the law
meant that the provisions on damages in the Regulations were no longer effective. In
practice, however, it appears that courts routinely award death compensation in medical
disputes and there is no longer any controversy about the issue. Hospitals and their lawyers
are not happy with this outcome, arguing that in many cases it is unfair to require
defendants to pay the full death compensation amount. Such criticism appears to be
primarily based on a belief that courts are too willing to award full death compensation
damages in cases in which causation between medical negligence and the death is either
unclear or only partial. The criticism is thus not that defendants should be immune from
liability but rather is that the existence of death compensation makes it too easy for courts
to hold defendants fully liable.
19 Prior to the passage of the Tort Law, the SPC had placed the burden of proof on
defendants, but the fact that determinations of fault were made by medical review boards
served to lessen the effect of the burden of proof. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Minshi
Susong Zhengju de Ruogan Guiding ( A= Vi i iiz) [Provisions
of the Supreme People's Court on Evidence in Civil Litigation] (promulgated by the Supreme
People's Court, Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002), art. 4, 2001 FA SHI 33.
[Vol. 30:113
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medical negligence. In other areas, however, the Tort Law failed to
clarify or unify practice. Most notably, the Tort Law did not address
whether inspections by medical association medical review boards should
continue to be a prerequisite to suits against hospitals or whether
plaintiffs in medical cases may rely on inspections carried out by judicial
inspection organizations.
At the time the Tort Law was passed, it was widely expected that the
Supreme People's Court would resolve many ambiguities in the law
through a judicial interpretation. The SPC circulated a draft judicial
interpretation on medical cases in 2011 that would have allowed
inspections by either judicial inspection organizations or by medical
review boards. Six years later, however, the interpretation has not been
adopted, most likely because of continuing debate and lobbying, in
particular by hospitals against the use of judicial inspections. Lawyers
involved in medical disputes also report uncertainty regarding whether
inspections should be carried out and overseen by the Ministry of Justice
(which oversees judicial inspection organizations) or the Ministry of
Health (which oversees medical associations). Debate also exists
regarding whether inspections should be issued in the name of individual
doctors taking part in the inspection or in the name of the medical
association alone and regarding whether inspections should be viewed as
a for-fee service or as a professional obligation of doctors.
Courts have not waited for an SPC interpretation to alter their
practices. Courts in a number of provinces and provincial-level
municipalities, including Beijing and Henan, now allow plaintiffs to
choose whether to have inspections carried out by judicial inspection
institutions or by medical associations. 20 Yet the practice is not uniform,
with provinces adopting a wide range of practices. 21 Shanghai, Zhejiang,
and Jiangsu continue to require that medical association review boards
conduct inspections in medical cases unless both the plaintiff and the
defendant agree to use a judicial inspection. 22 Other jurisdictions have
adopted measures in between the permissive rules of Beijing and the
stricter standards imposed in Shanghai. In Guangdong, plaintiffs are
20 Beijingshi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa "Beijingshi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan
Guanyu Shenli Yiliao Sunhai Peichang Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian
(Shixing)" de Tongzhi (I A =]= A f ]
W=S.M (iW)T) ) NA) [Notice of the Beijing High People's
Court on the Issuance of "Beijing High People's Court Guiding Views (for Trial
Implementation) on Some Questions Concerning the Trying of Medical Injury
Compensation Cases"] (promulgated by the Beijing High People's Ct., Nov. 18, 2010,
effective Nov. 18, 2010), JING GAOFA 2010, No. 400, available at http://www.pkulaw.cn
/fulltextform.aspx?Gid=17241603&Db=lar.
21 Yang Fan (,%K) & Wang Guijun (=g9), Yiliao Qinquan Anjian Difang Zhidao
Wenjian Jianding Guifan Yanjiu ( [Research on
Local Guiding Documents Regulating Inspections in Medical Tort Cases], 23 Zhengju Kexue
(iiEt~4*) [EVIDENCE SCIENCE], no. 2, Apr. 2015, at 209.
22 Id.
20161
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permitted to use medical review boards or judicial inspection
organizations. But court rules impose specific requirements on the
experience and qualifications of persons taking part in inspections, with
stricter standards applying to re-inspections than to initial inspections,
apparently to ensure that only a small number of judicial inspection
organizations with a relatively high level of expertise are able to conduct
inspections in medical disputes. 23 Fujian reportedly has an internal
notice that allows the use of judicial inspections but requires that two
lawyers with "relevant experience" participate. In Hubei, high court rules
require the use of medical association medical review boards, but lawyers
say that in practice local courts may allow them to use judicial inspections
to support claims alleging negligence by doctors and hospitals. 24
Hospital officials and their lawyers have expressed concern about the
increased use of judicial inspection organizations. Hospitals view the
organizations and the medical lawyers and forensics experts who
generally carry out the inspections as lacking the knowledge required to
assess causation in specialized areas of practice. As one hospital lawyer
argued in conversation, judicial inspection agency staff are trained to
make disability determinations and are largely unfamiliar with other
areas of medicine. Judicial inspection entities also continue to operate as
for-profit entities, making it unlikely that they will rule against the party
that retains them. Courts in theory could refuse to accept the decision of
a judicial inspection agency (or could order a second inspection). Lawyers
say, however, that it is almost unheard of for a court to refuse to accept
or to overturn a judicial inspection decision. It is unclear whether
replacing a system widely understood as unfair to patients with one
widely perceived as biased in favor of patients has helped to alleviate
patient distrust in the legal framework governing medical disputes. One
plaintiffs' lawyer commented that the legal framework governing medical
disputes remains one of "legal chaos." 25
23 Guangdong Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa "Guangdong Fayuan Sifa
Weituo Ruxuan Zhuanye Jigou (2015 Nian Xiuding) de Jiben Tiaojian" de Tongzhi (r r,'
A ~ ~ W~*~(2015 ftfIT 04t*1+) 0,iiYM)
[Notice of the Guangdong Province High People's Court on the Issuance of the "Basic
Requirements for the Judicial Entrustment and Selection of Expert Institutions by
Guangdong Courts (2015 Revision)], YuE GAOFA, No. 114, April 15, 2015.
24 Because the Tort Law abolished a distinction between cases alleging medical accidents
and those alleging medical negligence, medical review boards in jurisdictions such as
Shanghai now make determinations regarding medical negligence, not just medical
accidents. Yet it is unclear whether review board staff have focused on whether there is a
difference between the standards for finding fault under the Regulations and under the Tort
Law.
2z The Tort Law has also resulted in new sources of perceived unfairness and new forms
of creative lawyering. The shift of the burden of proof to plaintiffs has been decried by
plaintiffs' lawyers, who note the difficulties they face in obtaining evidence given the lack
of discovery procedures in China. In response, lawyers have sought to bring an increasing
number of suits for illegal hospital actions and alterations to medical records, where the
burden of proof is on defendants.
[Vol. 30:113
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China's Tort Law was not specifically designed to address problems
of protest and violence in medical disputes, although some involved in the
drafting process did aim to create a system that was fairer to both
plaintiffs and hospitals. Other rules and regulations adopted since 2010
have attempted to address the problem of protest and violence directly.
Such regulations do so by seeking to restrict the ability of hospitals to
engage in settlement talks with aggrieved patients or by treating patient
protest as a problem of law and order.
Local authorities in a number of jurisdictions have attempted to
reduce the pressure on hospitals to settle medical disputes by enacting
rules mandating mediation of patient grievances. Under such rules, all
claims exceeding a specified amount, generally either 10,000 or 20,000
yuan, must be referred to a mediation entity established under the local
health bureau. Mediators are generally retired health bureau personnel
with some medical background. The main goal of such rules appears to
be to restrict the ability of hospitals to settle and thus to reduce protest:
if hospitals are banned from settling large cases then patients and family
members will have less incentive to protest at hospitals. Some lawyers
suggest that imposing mandatory mediation may also help to diffuse
protest by prolonging the settlement process.
There is little evidence on whether such restrictions are having an
effect on hospitals or patients.2 6 There is no sanction for hospitals that
decide to settle disputes above the stipulated amount and no enforcement
mechanism to compel patients or their families to go to mediation. 27 One
Beijing hospital official said that approximately 70 percent of patient
grievances are now referred to mediation entities, but added that
convincing patients to use mediation still requires extensive effort.
Mediation may be effective for low-value disputes but appears largely
ineffective for more serious claims. Some lawyers who represent plaintiffs
comment that mediation entities are more fair than medical association
review boards. Nevertheless, the neutrality of mediation organizations is
questionable. Local health authorities (who also oversee hospitals)
establish and oversee medical mediation entities, and, in at least some
provinces, the mediation committees are funded by hospital insurers.
National authorities have also sought to increase sanctions against
protestors. In April 2014, five central government departments issued a
notice on medical disputes. 28 As with similar local regulations that
2 Some observers have praised the mediation entities for resolving a large number of
disputes, but do so based primarily on the total number of cases undergoing mediation.
Existing academic studies examine the types of claims leading to grievances, not patient
confidence in the outcomes or the amounts paid through mediation compared to those paid
through litigation or private settlement.
27 This is likely because there is no legal basis to mandate mediation of medical disputes.
Health bureaus may be able to bar hospitals from settling disputes, but they cannot
mandate that patients engage in mediation prior to going to court.
28 Wu Bumen Guanyu Yifa Chengchu Sheyi Weifa Fanzui Weihu Zhengchang Yiliao Shi
Zhixu de Yijian ( 'ii ' [,JQ) [Opinion of
2016]
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preceded the national notice, the rules can be read primarily as describing
the forms of protest and violence that hospitals have faced in recent years.
The rules bar destroying hospital property; beating or threatening
doctors; insulting or threatening medical staff; setting up funeral shrines
at hospitals; blocking hospital entrances; bringing explosives, hazardous
materials, or weapons to hospitals; and leaving the bodies of deceased
patients at hospitals. 29
Revisions to China's Criminal Law in August 2015 criminalized
protest against hospitalsO Article 290 of the Criminal Law provides for a
criminal sentence of three to seven years for anyone leading a mob to
cause serious disruption of social order. 31 The revision added obstructing
a hospital's operation to the list of examples of conduct giving rise to
criminal sanctions under the provision. Commentators have noted that
the revision is intended to criminalize serious cases of medical protest.32
The legal response to protest has been largely reactive, seeking to
constrain violence and protest. Such steps do appear to be having some
effect. Doctors and hospitals report modest improvement in the handling
of patient protests. Hospital officials say that the situation is improving,
because of better coordination with the police and the permanent
stationing of police at many hospitals and because of improved internal
Five Departments on Sanctioning According to Law Illegal Criminal Conduct Relating to
Medical Care in Order to Protect Regular and Timely Medical Procedures] (promulgated by
the Sup. Peoples' Court, Sup. People's Procuratorate, Pub. Sec. Bureau, Ministry of Justice,
and the Nat'l Health and Family Planning Comm., Apr. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.spp.gov.cn/flfg/201404/t20140428-71374.shtml.
29 The notice appears to be an attempt to signal to the police that they should take medical
protests seriously and that hospitals and police should improve coordination to prevent
major incidents. The notice also calls for better service by hospitals, improved reporting of
disputes, and increased legal services for patients. Id.
30 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa Xiuzheng'an (Jiu) (,P RffJO{ A
(A)) [Criminal Law Amendment IX of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 29, 2015, effective Nov. 1, 2015), amend. 31,
2005 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 5; Xingfa XiuZheng'an Tongguo "Yinao"
Zhong Ru Xing (T8J 1 -] A]i_ "-I W" tAJ) [Criminal Law Amendments Finally
Criminalize 'Medical Chaos'l, Beijing Xiehe Yiyuan (OLA t fP E R) [PEKING UNION
MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL] (May 5, 2016), http://www.pumch.cn/Item/14605.aspx.
31 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (rP fAThJ8) [Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar.
14, 1997, rev'd Aug. 29, 2015, effective Nov. 1, 2015), art. 290.
32 Bai Jianfeng (0 M ), Renmin Ribao Bu Tu Bu Kuai: Shangyi Ruyi Shi Shehui Zhichi
(AkF H Tt±TtI : fMK4EAU _kZ ) [People's Daily Getting it off One's Chest: Harming
Doctors and Insulting Doctors are the Shame of Society], Renmin Ribao (A K E *) [PEOPLE'S
DAILY] (July 10, 2015), http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2015/0710/c1003-27282054.html. It
appears that even before the revision of the Criminal Law the Supreme People's
Procuratorate (SPP) had begun to emphasize serious attacks on medical staff. The SPP
reported 347 prosecutions nationwide for attacks on medical staff in 2014. Zui Gao Jian:
Quanguo Yinian Banli Wenling Shayi Deng Yanzhong Sheyi Fanzui 347 Ren (i : ±R
347 k) [SPP: 347 Cases Brought in One Year for Serious
Criminal Actions Relating to Medical Care Such as the Wenling Doctor Murder] Zhongguo
Xinwen Wang ( M NP) [CHINA NEWS] (June, 24, 2015), http://www.chinanews.comi
gn/2015/06-24/7362441.shtml.
[Vol. 30:113
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hospital procedures for managing patient grievances. The role of
professional protestors in medical disputes appears to be decreasing, at
least in major cities. But little attention has been paid to steps that might
help to prevent disputes or the escalation of disputes in the first place.
Continuing media coverage of assaults on doctors suggests that the
problem remains extensive and deep-rooted. 3
3
III. ON THE STREETS AND IN THE COURTROOM
The discussion above suggests that the formal legal framework has
contributed to mistrust between doctors and patients. Yet focusing on
written law misses much of the complexity of how medical disputes are
actually resolved. This section highlights four characteristics of medical
disputes in China that are not captured by examining formal legal
provisions. Evidence suggests that while the "shadow of the law" has
limited effect on hospital-patient disputes, the shadow of violence has a
significant effect on hospitals and on courts. 34 The threat of protest keeps
many cases out of court and casts a shadow over how courts handle cases
that do wind up in the formal legal system.
First, although the Regulations in theory provided hospitals with a
legal framework in which payouts for malpractice claims were low, in
practice the legal standards provided little or minimal protection to
hospitals. Hospitals reported routinely settling cases for more than they
would be required to pay if they lost the same case in court. Whether
hospitals faced a protest or threat of protest was generally the most
important factor influencing the resolution of medical disputes.
Settlements were and are often made with little regard to legal provisions
and often exceeded the amounts that would be payable in court. Faced
with protestors, most hospitals paid, regardless of whether they thought
the claim had merits. This was true in particular before China's Tort
Liability Law came into force in 2010. As damage awards in court have
risen since 2010, the dynamic may be less pronounced. 35
The willingness of hospitals to pay in excess of legally stipulated
amounts reflects the fact that the financial impact of settlements and
court judgments on major hospitals remains relatively minor. Hospitals
are reluctant to reveal information regarding settlements and judgments
against them. Informal conversations make clear that the financial
impact of disputes is often a secondary concern for hospitals. Hospitals
33 See, e.g., Chris Buckley, A Danger for Doctors in China: Patients'Angry Relatives, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/world/asia/china-attacks-doctor
s-hospitals.html?_r=0.
4 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 140 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1946) (1835).
35 Some hospitals report that the amount they are willing to offer in settlement depends
on the court in which patients are likely to file a claim. One Beijing hospital official noted
that some district courts in Beijing are understood to be more patient-friendly than others.
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remain more concerned about the reputational impact of disputes. Such
concerns include both the immediate impact of protestors interfering with
day-to-day hospital operations and also the potential influence on
hospitals' relationships with their administrative supervisors.3 6
Second, although most cases are resolved outside the courts, the
number of medical disputes in the courts has also surged since the early
2000s. 37 The threat of protest and violence leads courts to provide
compensation to most plaintiffs, even those with weak legal claims. The
legal system may have been weighted in favor of hospitals, but court
practice reacted to the threat of instability by seeking to ensure plaintiffs
recovered some damages. My prior study of medical disputes in one
municipality in central China found that plaintiffs recovered some
damages in 77 percent of cases. 3 Courts were particularly likely to award
damages in cases of clear violations of medical practice or standards, such
as prescribing overdoses of medication, cases of clear misdiagnosis, and
cases of extreme outcomes from common procedures. But court-awarded
compensation often appeared tied as much to the severity of the plaintiffs
injury as to the degree of the defendant's wrongdoing. Compromise
verdicts are frequent, with courts appearing to require each party to
undertake half of the damages suffered.
That plaintiffs receive some damages does not mean they have won
their case. Plaintiffs often recover only a portion of the amount sought in
court. Plaintiff appeals of cases in which they received compensation are
common, reflecting plaintiff dissatisfaction with the amounts awarded.
Nevertheless, the fact that plaintiffs generally do receive some
compensation from courts demonstrates that claims that plaintiffs have
no chance in court are overstated.
Court decisions do not provide a framework that influences
negotiations outside of court. Instead, stability concerns shape outcomes
in court. Judges confirm that they sometimes order hospitals to pay
damages in cases in which there is no evidence of error in order to appease
plaintiffs and prevent protest. Courts seek ways to expand liability
against hospitals, including awarding damages even when there is no or
little evidence of causation between the alleged negligence and the injury.
Thus, courts in my study awarded damages for wrongdoing such as
3 The fact that hospitals are generally less concerned with the financial impact of
disputes than with the effect on their reputation does not mean that the amounts in
controversy are insignificant. The growth in disputes and the financial opportunities such
disputes present resulted in the development of a specialized bar within the legal profession.
Many lawyers who handle such cases are former doctors. Although most represent hospitals,
there are a small number of lawyers in most major cities who specialize in representing
plaintiffs, often in part on a contingent-fee basis.
3 The Supreme People's Court reported that courts nationwide heard 17,000 medical
malpractice claims in 2010, a 7.6 percent increase from 2009. Supreme People's Court
Statistics (on file with the author). Data on later years appears to be unavailable.
38 As far as I am aware, no empirical study of medical malpractice litigation has been
carried out since my study in 2013.
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failure to maintain records, failure to produce evidence, illegal practice of
medicine or use of doctors with insufficient qualifications, denial of
treatment, or incomplete diagnosis and treatment. In three cases courts
awarded damages for patient suicides or attempted suicides. 39 In other
cases courts awarded damages against large hospitals even though the
primary harm had resulted from patients seeking care from unlicensed
doctors at local clinics. 4°
Judges believe that appeals and protest are minimized by ensuring
that plaintiffs receive some compensation, even if courts need to push the
limits of (or ignore) existing law in order to reach such outcomes. 41 This
was particularly true prior to 2010, when judges sought to ameliorate the
low damage awards available under the Regulations by expanding other
forms of liability against hospitals, including by permitting claims for
ordinary negligence. 42 Judges also argue that they must take account of
plaintiffs' situations, and this means granting compensation to plaintiffs
facing difficult circumstances. Judges view themselves as being caught
between patients' demands, pressure from superiors to avoid escalation
and protest, and legal requirements.
The willingness of courts to award damages to most plaintiffs reflects
the institutional framework in which courts operate. As protest and
unrest surged in China in the early 2000s, courts became concerned with
preventing instability across a range of substantive areas. 43 Courts at
times appeared to serve as compensation agencies for the state, not
arbiters of fact or law. As one judge commented, "Courts are not law;
courts are a mechanism for solving government problems." Courts'
primary goal in many cases was to ensure that the case was resolved and
did not result in protest or escalation. Courts innovated in order to protect
themselves from protest and criticism, not to expand their authority.
The Decision of the Communist Party's Fourth Plenum in 2014 set
forth a roadmap for extensive reform to China's courts. 44 Reforms are
designed to make the courts more professional and more accessible and
to reduce external pressure on the courts. It remains too early to assess
the effect of these reforms on how courts adjudicate medical disputes.
9 Liebman, supra note 2, at 216-217, 236-37.
40 Court cases also provide a window into problems in China's healthcare system. Many
claims resulted from patients who delayed treatment until very late in an illness, likely due
to the high costs of treatment. Claims arising from the use of unlicensed doctors were
common. Likewise, many claims resulted from patients who sought drugs from third parties,
not hospitals, or who obtained care from doctors who were moonlighting away from their
regular place of employment.
41 There is almost certainly significant variation among courts. My study examined one
largely rural municipality in central China. Liebman, supra note 2, at 184.
42 My 2013 study found a modest increase in damage awards from 2001 to 2010, but very
few awards that could be classified as large - in the hundreds of thousands of yuan. Id.
43 Benjamin L. Liebman, Legal Reform: China's Law-Stability Paradox, 143 DAEDALUS,
no. 2, Spring 2014, at 96.
"Benjamin L. Liebman, Authoritarian Justice in China: Is There a 'Chinese Model'? in
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS? How CHINA HAS CHANGED THE WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND
EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL LEGAL PRACTICES 225 (Chen Weitseng ed., 2016).
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The threat of protest and violence from medical disputes remains and
appears likely to continue to influence how courts handle such cases.
Whether courts are permitted and encouraged to follow the law even
when state interests in social stability might suggest a different outcome
will be a key test of just how far the Fourth Plenum's reforms are
designed to go towards shifting the role of China's courts.
Third, government intervention in medical disputes is common.
Many disputes become disputes between protestors and government
officials. Hospitals at times welcome such intervention, as the
involvement of Party-state officials helps to shift responsibility for
disputes onto the shoulders of local officials. But intervention also results
in pressure on hospitals to settle. Intervention by government officials
into disputes between patients and hospitals confirms the view of
patients that hospitals are state actors and that such disputes are
fundamentally disputes with the state. State intervention appears to do
little to further patient trust in hospitals.
The willingness of officials to intervene in what in other countries
would be civil disputes between private parties reflects the reality that
the overwhelming majority of healthcare providers in China are state
actors. Yet it also reflects a dynamic that I have described elsewhere as
the "over-responsive state."45 Faced with unrest, officials are unwilling to
allow the legal system to resolve disputes. This responsiveness, even if a
rational response of state actors, 46 also furthers the belief that the state
will ultimately intervene to provide assistance to those in need.
Intervention incentivizes further unrest.
Fourth, the resolution of medical disputes on the streets and in
courtrooms suggests that many of the problems are systemic, reflecting
not just the healthcare system or the courts but also the functioning of
the Chinese political system as a whole. Trust in institutions and
individual state actors (including courts and hospitals) is weak in
China, 47 even though trust in the central Party-state remains robust.48
Problems in the healthcare system and the fact that medical care often
involves questions of life and death exacerbate this distrust. Breaking the
cycle of distrust in hospitals and in the courts is not simply a question of
improving the quality of courts or of medical care.
The rise in patient-hospital conflict demonstrates how trust can
spiral downward even as institutions improve and highlights the fact that
trust depends both on the quality of institutions and on popular
expectations. China's healthcare system and courts improved
significantly between the start of the reform era in 1978 and the early
41 Liebman, supra note 2, at 242-51.
46Reliance on protest may make sense as a screen for those with legitimate grievances.
Liebman, supra note 2; Peter L. Lorentzen, Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Protest in an
Authoritarian Regime, 8 Q.J. POL. SC. 127.
47 Li Lianjiang, Political Trust in Rural China, 30 MOD. CHINA 228, 232 (2004).
48 Elizabeth J. Perry, Chinese Conceptions of 'Rights": From Mencius to Mao-and Now,
6 PERSP. ON POL. 37 (2008).
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2000s. Yet reforms to institutions failed to keep up with popular
expectations regarding how these institutions should function.
IV. LEGALIZING TRUST?
Neither China's formal law nor court practice created the cycles of
distrust that characterize patient-doctor interactions and that result in
protest and violence. But the legal framework almost certainly made such
problems worse. Can the legal system play a more constructive role in
reducing patient-doctor conflict? This essay concludes with four
observations regarding the potential role of law in addressing the
problems that result in distrust between doctors and patients.
First, one lesson learned from examining the role of law in the rise of
patient-hospital conflict in the 2000s is that over-reliance by hospitals on
a legal framework heavily tilted in their favor likely exacerbated conflict
by incentivizing patients to use protest and by producing a backlash in
the courts. The interaction of formal legal rules that were clearly one-
sided with weak trust in official institutions and a strong tradition of
protest produced a cocktail of unrest. It is in the interests of patients and
doctors alike to have legal rules that attempt to achieve a balance
between patients and healthcare providers. The current chaotic web of
different practices, with some courts permitting patients to rely on for-
hire judicial inspection organizations and others insisting on the
continued use of medical review boards, has done little to improve
confidence in the system, from patients or doctors. Likewise, building
effective mediation institutions requires ensuring that such institutions
are neutral arbiters of disputes, not just health bureau (or insurance
company) efforts to shift the locus of dispute away from hospitals and to
reduce compensation payments.
Most of the legal reaction to the rise of medical protest and violence
has been punitive, focusing on stopping protest, rather than addressing
the problems that'give rise to protest. Recent efforts to criminalize protest
against hospitals and to outlaw specific patient conduct linked to protest
may reduce the frequency of extreme actions by patients and their
families. Such provisions will not result in greater trust in medical care.
Many recently proposed or initiated reforms focus on dispute
avoidance, not improving the quality of care. Some commentators in
China have argued for the creation of government-backed compensation
funds to provide assistance to patients who suffer adverse outcomes from
medical care not linked to negligent care. Such proposals appear
primarily designed to shift the burden of disputes away from hospitals.
Likewise, some hospitals in China have begun experiments designed to
reduce the likelihood of disputes. One Beijing hospital now requires that
lawyers be present when doctors inform patients of the risks of surgery.
The goal appears to be both to dissuade patients from suing and to ensure
that doctors provide adequate information to patients. Some hospitals
likewise have expanded the use of lawyers in training doctors about
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needed disclosures; one hospital now video records doctors informing
patients of possible adverse outcomes in high-risk cases. At least one
hospital in Beijing has experimented with mandating that patients
undergoing high-risk surgery purchase insurance (sold by the same
company that insures the hospital) against adverse outcomes not due to
negligence. The goal appears to be both to raise awareness of adverse
outcomes and to shift the burden of paying for such outcomes to patients.
Second, the discussion of the legal framework governing doctor-
patient interactions in China must shift from a focus on dispute
resolution to a focus on other measures that might help to strengthen
doctor-patient relationships. Disputes reflect a breakdown or lack of trust;
disputes are rarely the cause of mistrust. The lack of patient trust in the
medical system is the result of a range of problems in the healthcare
system. Most such problems are unlikely to be addressed by new legal
provisions. There is also a need to shift the legal and policy conversation
in China from a focus on dispute resolution to thinking about whether
law can play a role in improving patient confidence in the system through
measures other than dispute resolution.
There are no easy solutions, but experience in other jurisdictions
suggests a range of legal and policy steps that should receive increased
attention. These include provisions mandating greater disclosure of risks,
increased transparency regarding errors and standards, stronger limits
on conflicts of interests, clearer practice standards for doctors, greater
emphasis on patient health literacy, mandatory reporting of adverse
outcomes, and stronger confidentiality provisions for professional
investigations of misconduct. None of these offers a perfect solution;
scholarship in the U.S. has argued that law plays only a limited role in
increasing trust.49 But greater focus on such measures would begin to
shift the focus away from disputes and toward measures that might
prevent error, improve patient confidence, and reduce the likelihood of
patient protest.50
Increased transparency measures are particularly worthy of further
attention as a mechanism for improving trust in the healthcare system.
Other state institutions, including the courts, securities regulators, and
China's environmental ministry, have sought to use transparency both to
reduce wrongdoing and to increase popular trust. Imposing greater
obligations on hospitals to report adverse outcomes and incidents of error
49 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 520 (2002).
50 Some involved in legal debates in China have expressed interest in apology laws that
would insulate doctor apologies from liability. Weak rules of evidence and procedure in
Chinese courts might make it difficult to ensure that apologies are not taken as admissions
of fault. Nevertheless, apology laws might provide some modest improvement to the
dynamics of distrust that give rise to so much conflict. Plaintiffs' lawyers have also argued
for increased use of criminal sanctions against doctors, a proposal not surprisingly viewed
skeptically by hospitals and doctors. Likewise, proposals to impose personal liability on
doctors have gained little traction. Imposing liability on doctors might well incentivize a
higher standard of care, but would do little to increase trust.
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might likewise offer modest improvements by reducing negligence and by
increasing patient trust.51 But transparency is needed not only regarding
errors, but also on appropriate practice standards and as part of a broader
effort to improve healthcare literacy.
Third, there is a need for a role for independent and autonomous
organizations that advocate on behalf of patient interests in both
individual cases and at the national level. Patient safety organizations
have played important roles in legal and policy debates in many other
countries. One lesson learned from the rise of medical conflict in China is
that failure to permit the evolution of autonomous and transparent
institutions may breed even more instability.
At the individual dispute level, much debate in China continues to
focus on whether courts should permit the use of judicial inspections or
should require inspections by medical review boards. Little of this debate,
however, has focused on whether steps could be taken to improve trust in
either set of institutions, for example by including patient advocates on
the review boards. Lawmakers, courts, and academics have failed to
create or even to propose institutions for evaluating medical error that
balance patient rights with the need for experts to assist in evaluating
whether or not medical error has occurred. Yet finding such potential
advocates is difficult given the lack of patient advocacy organizations.
At the national level, one reason that hospitals have proven to have
so much influence over policies and law is that there are no organizations
effectively advocating on behalf of patient interests. This is not surprising:
restrictions on the development of NGOs and other autonomous
organizations make it difficult for effective patient advocates to emerge
and to play such roles. This situation has been made worse by the recent
tightening of oversight over civil society.
Fourth, increasing patient trust in medical care will require greater
separation of hospitals from the state. Many of the problems discussed
above stem from low-quality care and over-burdened medical providers.
But the lack of separation between the state and hospitals contributes to
lack of trust and to violence by transforming many disputes into conflicts
with the state. State oversight also exacerbates pressure on hospitals to
settle, even in cases where there is little or no evidence of error, thus
incentivizing further protest.
Hospitals face many challenges, and some of these challenges stem
from the fact hospitals are expected to do too much. Yet some result from
the fact that hospitals remain very much state actors. Ties to the state
provide a measure of protection for hospitals, but also mean that popular
distrust in healthcare providers is not readily disentangled from popular
51 Developed legal systems of course also struggle to balance patients' interests in
compensation with the goal of improving medical care. The widespread practice in the U.S.
of sealed settlements in malpractice cases does little to improve transparency or to reduce
the frequency of error. See, e.g., Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public
Interest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 232, 246 (2008).
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distrust in a wider range of state institutions. Greater separation of
hospitals from the state would allow more neutral oversight of healthcare
providers and, in the long run, might also further patient trust.
Reforms to Chinese law may result in modest improvements to the
cycle of distrust that has resulted in so much violence - and which also
undermines patient care. Law can and should play a supporting role to
needed healthcare reforms. Yet the key observation of this essay is about
the limits of law in addressing patient-doctor distrust. The limited role of
law reflects both the weakness of law and also state ambiguity about the
role law should play in ordering Chinese society and governance. The
primary question in China remains not whether law can play a positive
role in reducing tensions, but whether law and the legal system can avoid
making these problems worse.
